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Abstract
The Post-Military Earnings of Female Veterans
The civilian labor market performance of women veterans is examined, using both
traditional data sets and a special survey of reservists that facilitates control for selection by the
military and enlistees. Evidence from all data sets indicates that female veterans possess a
higher level of measured earnings endowments than do nonveterans. Moreover, evidence from
the reservist survey supports the hypothesis that unobserved ability and preferences toward the
military are positively correlated with measured endowments. Absent control for unmeasured
quality and preferences, the observed wage advantage of female veterans is accounted for
entirely by differences in measured characteristics. Following their control, a wage
disadvantage is found for female veterans, relative to their nonveteran counterparts. An
exception is among nonwhite female veterans, who realize wage rates similar to nonveterans.
The low returns to military service for women may result from the narrow opportunities for
skill enhancement given women within the military, and an inability to transfer these skills to




In the last 15 years the representation of women in the U.S. military, as in other areas of
the labor force, has grown dramatically, rising from only 1.9 percent of the enlisted force in
1973 to nearly 11 percent in 1990 (GAO, 1991). Recently, the policy of excluding women
from certain military occupations, especially combat specialties, has come under intense
scrutiny (Presidential Commission, 1992). In early 1993, the Department of Defense removed
some of the barriers that had prevented women from serving in non-traditional jobs (Pexton
and Willis, 1993), and it appears that the military is poised to increase the steady-state flow of
female entrants into its ranks. Such changes will increase the stock of female veterans in the
civilian population, which by 1991 had reached 1.1 million (Department of Labor, 1992).
Despite numerous changes in women's role in the military, few studies have investigated the
civilian labor market experience of female service members following their military duty.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the civilian labor market performance of
women veterans. Our primary analysis uses a unique data set that deals with the special
circumstances surrounding the enlistment and occupational assignment of women. The
Reserve Components Surveys (RCS) (Defense Manpower Data Center, 1987a; 1987b) provide
data on veteran and nonveteran reservists, a population whose members are more alike in
numerous respects than a randomly selected sample of the civilian labor force. The survey's
sample design controls for numerous background factors that affect individual enlistment
behavior and that previously have not been measured. In addition to the RCS, we use standard
labor market data from the Current Population Surveys (CPS) and the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth (NLSY) to examine veteran earnings.
The attractiveness of the RCS, as compared to the CPS and NLSY, stems from the
expectation that selectivity is a particularly important factor bearing on female military
participation. From the standpoint of the armed forces, the number of women allowed to enter
the military has always been constrained by demand limitations. From the standpoint of
potential recruits, the military constitutes a nontraditional occupation for women. Hence,
controlling for the selection process may be more important for analyses of female veterans'
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earnings than it is for males.
Although prior research on the civilian earnings of veterans has been extensive, covering
both the volunteer era and periods when conscription was used, the literature has concentrated
almost exclusively on men. 1 To analyze veterans who served during conscription periods,
researchers have used various labor market surveys, including the CPS, the Census, and the
National Longitudinal Survey of Young Men. For the volunteer era, which began in 1973,
most prior studies have relied solely on the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY)
(see Bryant and Wilhite, 1990; Phillips, et al., 1992). Because of differences between women
and men in self selection, military demand restrictions, and occupational assignment, the
experiences of males may not provide a reliable guide to the effects of military service on
females.
A study by Mangum and Ball (1989; see, also 1987) is one of the few even to have
included female veterans. The authors use the NLSY to examine the determinants of the
transfer of military and other types of training, and the effect of skill transfer, veteran status,
and post-school training on the annual earnings and hourly wages of men and women
volunteer-era veterans. For women, the authors find that military training is less likely than
various types of civilian training to be transferred to civilian jobs. Post-school occupational
training does not appear to augment the wages of women, whereas it has a strong effect on
men's wages. Measures of military service — a veteran status dummy and time spent in the
military — are statistically insignificant in explaining women's hourly wages.
While Mangum and Ball offer preliminary evidence on the earnings of female veterans,
further research is clearly warranted. Although two-thirds of the population of female veterans
served during the pre-volunteer era (Cohany, 1990), Mangum and Ball must focus only on the
volunteer period because of the young sample in the NLSY. A further drawback of the NLSY
is that only a small number of female veterans from this period is available for analysis. Small
sample sizes are likely to account for their estimated veteran status coefficient of 0.427 for
women, implying a 53 percent wage premium for veteran women as compared to similar
nonveteran women. 2 Finally, their estimates are not corrected for selection bias, a potentially
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important issue when examining occupational assignment, skill transfer, and earnings. In the
present study, the Current Population Surveys and the Reserve Components Surveys are used
because they offer large samples of female veterans and because they provide data on veterans
from both draft and volunteer periods. The design of the RCS, moreover, provides a natural
control for important types of selectivity.
Section II of this paper analyzes the Reserve survey, as well as providing supplementary
evidence from the NLSY. Section III provides a similar analysis of female veteran and
nonveteran earnings utilizing data from the CPS. Conclusions follow in Section IV.
II. The Reserve Components Survey: Background and Results
The 1986 Reserve Components Survey (RCS) sampled 60,120 officer and enlisted
reservists. 3 Most reservists hold full-time civilian jobs and attend reserve drills for one
weekend per month and for two weeks during the summer to train in their specialty. What
makes the reserves a fertile ground for investigating veterans' earnings is that members are
divided between those who have prior active duty service and those who do not; that is, some
reservists are veterans and some are not. Furthermore, the RCS data provide implicit controls
for both program selection and self selection.
Self-selection arises in veterans' earnings studies because recruits have chosen the
military over other alternatives; in addition, veterans represent service members who have
chosen to separate from the military at the expiration of their term of service. Both of these
choices may hinge on unobserved characteristics. Censoring also occurs because veterans must
meet fairly stringent physical, mental, and moral standards to qualify for enlistment, and a
different set of standards (e.g., job performance) to be eligible for reenlistment. Because of
the limited number of military jobs available to female recruits, censoring at the enlistment
point is particularly important for women. If the factors that explain why some women enlist,
and why some subsequently separate, are also correlated with earnings, selectivity may bias
estimates of veteran status on civilian earnings.
The RCS data provide important controls for the heterogeneity that can bias earnings
-4-
studies. Since entrance standards for both reserve and active duty are the same, all RCS
respondents are qualified to serve on active duty. These entrance standards are based largely
on mental ability tests (AFQT), education, moral background (criminal record, drug use, etc.),
and physical or medical tests. Hence, differences in these important personal characteristics
for the reserve population — veterans and nonveterans alike — are minimized. This contrasts
to a random sample of the civilian population in which assignment to the treatment and control
groups (i.e., veterans and nonveterans) is based partly on these characteristics, but they
typically are not observed by the researcher.
A related source of selection bias is controlled in the RCS because of the similar
preferences or positive military propensity shared by all reservists. In a random sample,
preferences and alternative opportunities are major unobservables that explain why most
otherwise qualified youth do not attempt to join the military. In sum, the comparison group
design adopted here matches veterans with nonveterans who are similar in crucial respects,
except for active duty service. By controlling for many of the unobserved pre-treatment taste
and ability factors that account for the non-random assignment of the eligible population to the
treatment and control groups, the data may yield more precise estimates of the economic return
to military service. 4
Several considerations bear on the civilian earnings potential of female veterans. Women
have not only increased their representation in the military, they also have made dramatic
inroads into nontraditional military occupations. The proportion of military women in "non-
traditional" broad occupation categories increased from only 9.4 percent in 1972 to 45.0
percent in 1984, a six-fold increase (Eitelberg, 1988). Compared to their civilian
counterparts, military women are now much more heavily represented in the nontraditional
broad occupational categories of "electrical/repair," "communications/intelligence," and
"electrical/mechanical." Conversely, military women are far less likely than civilian women to
be working in traditional "functional support" jobs (Firestone, 1992). As a result of these
differences, military women may acquire advanced skill training, some of which is general in
nature and transferable to civilian employers. If skill acquisition differs significantly between
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nonveterans and veterans, female veterans may reap positive benefits from military service.
These gains are limited by the extent to which veterans' skills cannot be transferred to
civilian jobs, either because they are military-specific, or because nontraditional civilian jobs
for which veterans are trained either remain closed to women or are not sought out by female
veterans. Civilian earnings also will be affected if female veterans have different attachment
to the labor force than their nonveteran civilian peers. Finally, it has been shown that military
experience for men is often not a good substitute for civilian job experience (Trost and
Warner, 1979). Because of the importance of continuous job tenure to earnings, both male
and female veterans may suffer the earnings penalty that typically accompanies a job change,
especially if an occupation change is also involved. 5
To estimate veteran-nonveteran wage differentials among women, earnings functions are
specified using the log of hourly wages as the dependent variable. The RCS data are restricted
to enlisted reservists who worked in paid civilian jobs. Observations with missing (and in a
few cases implausible) values for any of the variables used in the analysis also were deleted.
These restrictions resulted in a usable sample of 1,946 women, of whom 25.0 percent were
veterans. Variables that capture general human capital include years of education, potential
work force experience, and potential experience squared. Current labor force status was
reflected in dummy variables for part-time status, government employment, and broad
occupation and industry (one-digit census codes) categories. Demographic variables
representing marital status (married, spouse present=l) and number of children are also
included in the specification.
Separate earnings equations are estimated for veteran and nonveteran female civilian
workers. This approach does not constrain the labor market rewards to other worker
characteristics to be equal for veterans and nonveterans. Equations are estimated for the full
sample and separately by race; they are also estimated separately for the draft and volunteer
eras. For the 1986 population of reservist-veterans, enlistment dates coincide with the
volunteer period (post- 1973) for respondents who are 30 and under. The draft-era subsample,
therefore, is restricted to those over age 30 and the volunteer era subsample to those 30 and
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under. It is unknown whether the earnings potential of female veterans will differ according to
era of service. On the one hand, women have always been volunteers, even during
conscription, and differences in enlistment behavior during the two eras may be slight. On the
other hand, differences may arise because the most recent draft period included the Vietnam
War and enlistment motives may differ between a draft/wartime period versus the
volunteer/peacetime period. For example, enlistment motives during recent years have
included the desire for employment and training; in contrast, during wartime non-economic
motives may have been relatively more important.
The issue of minority representation in the armed forces continues to be heatedly
debated. In 1989, racial and ethnic minorities accounted for 29 percent of the enlisted force,
roughly twice their percentage in the civilian population (Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense, 1990). A number of reasons have been advanced to explain why military service
may augment the productivity of nonwhites more than whites. These include the argument
that the military may be a more effective mechanism for nonwhites to make the transition from
school to the civilian workforce — the "bridging hypothesis" (Little and Fredland, 1979); that
the general training and skills received in the military are more valuable to nonwhites; and that
military service provides a more effective "screen" to employers. To account for these
possible differences, earnings differences are estimated for nonwhites and whites.
Table 1 provides regression estimates from the RCS, along with means of the variables,
from separate wage equations for female veterans and nonveterans of all eras and races.
Consistent with the belief that selectivity is important, there are notable differences between
the population of female reservists and the overall female labor force (compare the means in
Table 1 with nonveteran means from the CPS presented in Table 4). In the RCS sample, the
proportions of women who are nonwhite and work for the public sector are roughly twice as
high for reservists as for civilian women in general. Conversely, among reservists the
proportion of part-time workers is half what it is among the civilian labor force, and reservists
are far less likely to be married. Among reservists, nonveterans have 1.3 years less potential
experience and a higher percentage of nonwhites than veterans.
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Among the notable results evident in Table 1 is a steep wage-experience profile among
both veteran and nonveteran reservists. The estimated effect of experience for female
reservists is much closer to that of males than of females in the largely nonreservist civilian
labor force. For example, the experience-earnings profile for veterans in Table 2 is almost
identical to that estimated for males by Mangum and Ball (1989, Table 2, p. 239). In
contrast, the experience-earnings profile for females in the Mangum-Ball study is essentially
flat, while subsequent results reported here from the CPS indicate an experience profile with
an initial slope just half of that among reservists. This difference between reservists and
nonreservists may be due to the differences in characteristics noted above, especially the higher
labor force participation of female reservists. For example, while the labor force participation
rate in 1986 for females in the CPS is almost identical for veterans and nonveterans at 54.7
percent (Roca, 1986), the rate for all female reservists in the RCS is 82.5 percent.
The results in Table 1 are used to decompose the veteran-nonveteran log wage gap
(ln\Vv-ln\Vn), the results of which are displayed in column 1 of Table 2. This gap is
decomposed into the log wage difference owing to differences in measured characteristics,
referred to as the endowment effect, and differences in coefficients, referred to as the
coefficient effect. Let superscripts v and n index veteran and nonveteran, X the means of the
independent variables (i.e., measured characteristics), andjft the regression coefficients. The
endowment effect,
^
n(Xv-Xn), is computed by assuming the nonveteran wage structure applies
to both groups of workers; it is shown in column 2 of Table 2. The coefficient effect, Xv{^-
fi
n
), is shown in column 3; this represents the adjusted veteran-nonveteran wage differential.
The overall unadjusted veteran wage differentials is small, but as indicated in column 2,
veterans have substantially larger earnings endowments than do nonveterans. The coefficient
effect or adjusted wage differential in column 3 of Table 2 indicates a sizeable wage penalty,
of roughly 8 percent for veterans of all races and eras, after accounting for measured
characteristics. 6 Women veterans who served during draft periods appear to suffer a larger
wage penalty than those who served during the volunteer era. A result that appears in line
with prior results for male veterans is that whites incur a larger penalty for military service
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than nonwhites; white female veterans are penalized nearly 12 percent whereas the differential
for nonwhites is essentially zero. One feature of Table 2 is the consistently large and positive
endowment effect. It appears that female veterans possess larger stocks of human capital and
other characteristics that enhance their productivity in the civilian work force. These
differences between veterans and nonveterans in productivity-enhancing characteristics are
such that female veterans would earn sizeable wage premiums if they were paid according to
the nonveteran wage structure.
Because of small sample sizes, the approach adopted in Table 2 (i.e., separate wage
equation estimates by group) is not used to investigate wage differences by race, schooling
groups, and period of service. The approach used in Table 3 involves pooling veterans and
nonveterans and using interaction terms. The coefficient of the veteran status dummy variable
in line 1 of Table 3, indicating a veteran penalty of approximately 9 percent, is similar to that
reported previously based on separate equations. In line 2, the estimates by race indicate that
the veteran penalty is 12 percent for whites, but only about 2 percent for nonwhites. While
this approach does not allow the effects of other independent variables to differ by race, it
seems clear that the relative performance of nonwhite female veterans in the civilian labor
market is far less negative than among white veterans.
When veteran wage differentials are examined by schooling group, as shown in line 3,
women with high school diplomas (or less) and those with some college experience an almost
identical wage penalty of 10 percent. The differential for college graduates, however, is
considerably less negative, and is statistically insignificant. The veteran wage penalty by era
in line 4 is virtually identical to that observed in Table 2. There is some variation, however,
in the return to military service by era between the races, as shown in line 5. White veterans
incur penalties during both periods, while the coefficient for nonwhites is essentially zero for
both periods.
This paper argues that the RCS data are superior to random surveys in terms of
controlling for unobserved factors that affect both enlistment and separation (i.e., veteran
status) and earnings. To provide a basis for examining this claim, veteran-nonveteran wage
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differentials are also computed using data from the NLSY and, in the next section, the CPS.
In the NLSY, samples are not randomly assigned to treatment and control (i.e., veteran and
nonveteran) groups but, rather, are determined based on taste and ability differences. The
direction of the potential bias is unknown, although if AFQT scores and previously measured
endowments are positively correlated, than adjusted differentials should be more negative
following control for AFQT. The NLSY for 1984 is used for this comparison as this was the
last year that the large sample of armed forces members (originally interviewed in 1979) were
still in the survey. Even though the 1984 panel provided the largest sample of veterans in the
NLSY, observations on only 191 female veterans are available. The specification is similar to
that used for the RCS and, subsequently, the CPS (full results are available on request).
Table 2 also presents estimated wage differentials computed from the NLSY. Due to the
young age of the NLSY respondents in 1984, these results can be compared only to the RCS
results for the volunteer era. Note that AFQT scores are available in the NLSY to provide a
partial control for military selection standards. The wage models are estimated with and
without AFQT to determine how the presence of the control influences the measured wage
effect of veteran status. Differences in the NLSY results with and without controlling for
AFQT indicate positive selection into the military. That is, the veteran-nonveteran wage
differential is less negative not controlling for AFQT than following control for AFQT. This
is consistent with the relatively stringent enlistment standards for women throughout the
volunteer period. Comparison of the NLSY results with those from the RCS, however,
suggest that AFQT scores provide only a partial control for selectivity, based most likely on
military entrance standards, whereas the RCS data provide controls for self selection as well as
administrator selection.
HI. Evidence from the Current Population Surveys
Further evidence is presented on the civilian earnings of female veterans and
nonveterans, based on the Current Population Surveys (CPS) for 1989-1992. The CPS
provides information on large representative samples of U.S. households. The CPS has not
- 10-
been used previously to examine the relative earnings of female veterans, owing in part to the
fact that the CPS did not begin the regular recording of women's veteran status until the 1989
surveys, and in part because of the very small sample sizes of female veterans in each monthly
public use survey. Our sample is constructed from the 48 monthly Current Population Survey
(CPS) Outgoing Rotation Group (ORG) files conducted between January 1989 and December
1992. Each ORG file comprises the quarter sample of the CPS that is asked the questions on
the earnings supplement (e.g., weekly earnings, hours worked, and union status). The CPS
ORG "earnings microdata files" are not public use files, but are made available by the Data
Services Group at the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
The CPS ORG files are well-suited for providing evidence on civilian earnings
differences among relatively large and representative samples of the U.S. female (and male)
veteran and nonveteran populations. Wage differentials can be measured unadjusted for wage
correlates other than veteran status, or estimated conditional on measured individual and labor
market characteristics. The major disadvantage of the CPS is that it is not well-suited to
control for selectivity, or unmeasured quality and taste differences between veterans and
nonveterans. This contrasts with the RCS, which controls for both military selection and self-
selection by comparing veteran and nonveteran reservists, and the NLSY, which partially
controls for both types of selectivity through the inclusion of AFQT scores. If there exists
positive selection among female veterans, as suggested in the previous section, we would
expect the CPS evidence on earnings to appear more favorable toward veterans than does
evidence from the RCS and NLSY.
The CPS sample includes all employed female wage and salary workers ages 20 and over
with positive weekly earnings and hours, whose principal activity during the survey week was
not school. Of the total sample of 322,702 women, 3,331 (1.0 percent) are veterans. We
measure the wage rate by usual weekly earnings divided by usual hours worked per week, in
December 1992 dollars. The veteran-nonveteran logarithmic wage differential is 0.0649
indicating a 6.7 percentage wage advantage for female veterans relative to nonveterans.
The Appendix provides descriptive evidence for five-year birth cohorts on the percentage
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veteran, average wages by veteran status, mean years of schooling by veteran status, and
percentage nonwhite by veteran status. The top panel of the table provides information for
women. For purposes of comparison, the bottom panel contains the same information for men
(the sample for men has been constructed identically to that for women). The percentage
veteran is below 1 percent for all older female cohorts, except for the cohort born prior to
1930, which includes WWII-era veterans. The 1955-59 and 1960-64 cohorts have a somewhat
higher percentage veteran, reflecting the increased participation of women in the military. As
expected, the 1965-72 cohort has a relatively small number of female veterans who were out
of the military, out of school, and in the civilian labor force by 1989-92. Average wage
differences largely mirror differences in mean years of schooling. There is a wage advantage
to most earlier cohorts of female veterans, corresponding to a schooling advantage of about
one year. Recent cohorts of female veterans, however, have schooling and wage rates similar
to their nonveteran counterparts. Just as is the case for males, nonwhites are underrepresented
in the military among older cohorts, while being overrepresented among younger cohorts.
Table 4 provides sample means and regression coefficients from separate log wage
equations for female veterans and nonveterans. Control variables in the regression equation
are years of schooling completed, years of potential experience (age-schooling-5) and its
square, race, marital status dummies (2), number of children, union status, part-time status,
residence in a metropolitan area with one million plus population, public sector status (4),
occupation dummies (5), industry dummies (13), Census region (8), and year dummies (3).
Regression coefficients are broadly similar to those obtained from the RCS. Veterans have an
approximate half year advantage in average schooling, and small advantages in the proportion
union members and proportion full-time. Veterans are less likely, however, to reside in large
metropolitan areas. A notable difference in mean characteristics is the greater proportion of
veterans in relatively highly rewarded federal government and postal service jobs. Note that
hiring preferences for veterans in these sectors account in part for these employment
differences. One might argue, therefore, that inclusion of the public sector dummies biases
downward estimates of the total effect of veteran status on earnings (the veteran-nonveteran
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differential is somewhat higher when these are excluded). Differences in coefficients include a
larger intercept for veterans (this may reflect a higher but flatter wage gradient with respect to
earnings determinants, and differences in wages between veterans and nonveterans in the
omitted reference group), and coefficients on the marriage variables close to zero, as opposed
to positive marriage coefficients of about .05 for nonveterans (a similar difference in
coefficients is seen in the RCS sample).
Differences in veteran and nonveteran log wages can be decomposed into that portion
explained by differences in endowments or characteristics (weighted by the nonveteran
earnings structure), and that portion owing to differences in coefficients (evaluated using
veteran means). Although this decomposition is not unique, the choice of nonveteran
coefficient weights is appropriate in this case since female veterans comprise such a tiny part
of the labor force. These results are presented in Table 2, where they can be compared to
results obtained previously using the RCS and NLSY. The veteran log wage advantage of
.0649 can be accounted for almost entirely by differences in measured characteristics, the
endowment effect being .0615. The unexplained veteran-nonveteran difference is only .0034.
Although not the focus of this paper, we note that an identical analysis for men reveals a larger
unadjusted veteran log wage advantage (. 1345), but one which is also accounted for by
measured characteristics, in particular the higher average age (experience) among male
veterans than nonveterans (the endowment effect is .1523 and unexplained difference -.0178).
While the CPS results for women are highly similar to the NLSY results excluding the
AFQT measure, they differ substantially but in a predictable way with results from the RCS.
Whereas the RCS (and the NLSY with AFQT included) show a wage disadvantage for female
veterans relative to nonveterans, the CPS results indicate, on average, little wage difference
between veterans and nonveterans. We believe an important reason for these differences is
that selectivity bias is more serious in the CPS, given the absence of an explicit quality
measure such as AFQT, or natural controls for unobservables such as that present in the
sample of reservists. In the RCS, CPS, and NLSY, female veterans have superior
endowments as compared to their nonveteran counterparts. For example, in the CPS
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unadjusted wage differentials are more favorable to veterans by roughly .06 log points, as
compared to adjusted differentials.
Qualitative differences in female veteran premiums based on race and education are
reasonably similar between the CPS and RCS surveys. Table 3 provides alternative estimates
of veteran-nonveteran differences, based on pooled equations with appropriate interaction
terms. Shown are the results of the following specifications (all equations include a full set of
control variables): 1) veteran dummy only; 2) a veteran dummy and a nonwhite-veteran
interaction term to allow separate estimates for whites and nonwhites; 3) separate coefficients
by schooling group; 4) separate coefficients for draft-era and volunteer-era women (draft-era
workers are defined as those who were age 21 or over in 1973); and 5) separate coefficients
for white and nonwhite draft-era and volunteer-era women. To compare the CPS results for
females to those for men, the right-hand side of the table provides equivalent estimates for
males. The data source, time period, and sample selection criteria are identical for women and
men.
Regression results with a veteran dummy variable (line 1) indicate a difference of,
essentially, zero (.0033), matching our previous result (.0034) based on separate veteran and
nonveteran equations. In line 2, separate estimates are provided by race. Whereas we find no
significant difference in earnings between white veterans and nonveterans (-.0027), there is a
small (.0349) but significant premium realized by nonwhite veterans, relative to their
nonveteran counterparts. The evidence on racial differences is similar in the RCS and CPS
samples. The suggestion from the data is that in contrast to whites, nonwhite veterans possess
an unobserved productivity advantage relative to nonwhite nonveterans. We cannot discern
from the data the source of the differential. This productivity advantage may be the result of
selectivity by the armed forces, such that nonwhite recruits place higher in the ability
distribution among the nonwhite population than do white recruits among the overall white
population, or it may result directly from a relatively greater enhancement of skills acquired in
military service by nonwhites than by whites. We suspect both are important sources of racial
differences in veteran-nonveteran wage differences. Because we obtain a similar racial pattern
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of results in the RCS and CPS, even though the reservists sample already controls to some
extent for military selection, we lean toward the latter explanation.
The pattern of veteran wage differentials with respect to schooling are found to be
similar in both the CPS and RCS. Women with some college and those with a high school
education or less realize similar differentials. By contrast, the wage differential is significantly
higher (roughly .05 less negative in the RCS, or .04 more positive in the CPS) among college
graduates. In the CPS, veteran-nonveteran differences are estimated to be -.007, -.009, and
.033 for civilian workers with no more than a high school diploma, with some college, and
with a college degree, respectively. This pattern with respect to schooling is similar to that
found among males. Our schooling breakdown, which does not separate out workers with less
than a high school diploma (among recent cohorts, very few women who have not completed
high school are admitted into the military) masks the traditionally high returns to military
service found for older, less-educated males (see Berger and Hirsch, 1983, for evidence). A
compelling explanation for a more favorable veteran-nonveteran performance by college
graduates is not readily evident. One possibility is that educational benefits provided to
veterans permit them to make economically desirable but otherwise liquidity-constrained
investments in schooling. Recent evidence by Angrist (1993) from the 1987 Survey of
Veterans indicates that veteran benefits increase schooling levels by an average 1.4 years, with
benefits accruing primarily to those attending college and graduate school. Returns to years of
schooling following service are not particularly high (about 4.3 percent a year), however,
resulting in an earnings increase of about 6 percent.
We next examine differences in veteran-nonveteran differences among women likely to
have served during the draft and AVF eras. Differences in the veteran differential by time
period of service are small and insignificant, reflecting, perhaps not surprisingly, little effect
of the draft on women. It is important to note that with data covering a short time span (4
years for the CPS), we cannot distinguish between the effects of draft versus volunteer-era
service, birth cohort, or age. In work not shown, we find little difference in veteran-
nonveteran wage differentials when these are estimated separately either by 10-year birth
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cohorts or age groups. In fact, we had expected to find a veteran wage disadvantage for young
women (below age 30) who are making the transition from military to civilian work, coupled
with a steeper wage profile as catch-up takes place. Note that such a pattern of initially
depressed earnings but faster wage growth is typical of the previous evidence reported for male
veterans (and confirmed by us in results not shown). The literature on male veterans suggests
that this pattern reflects some combination of age, cohort, draft-era, and year effects.
IV. Conclusions
Despite considerable attention and the increasing importance of women in the military,
there exists little scholarly evidence on the relative civilian earnings of female veterans. This
paper provides what we hope is a valuable step in that direction. Although deficiencies in
available data place unavoidable limitations on such an analysis, we believe our study has
advanced knowledge in this area. Data from the 1986 Reserve Components Surveys (RCS),
the 1989-92 Current Population Surveys (CPS), and the 1984 National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth (NLSY) have been used to estimate veteran-nonveteran wage differences in civilian
employment. Each of the surveys has its advantages and disadvantages. The CPS provides
relatively large and representative samples of the U.S. labor force, but provides no direct way
to control for what are potentially important selectivity biases owing to selection by the
military and recruits owing to unmeasured ability and taste differences between veterans and
nonveterans. The NLSY provides a direct ability measure (the AFQT) and a large number of
variables on socioeconomic and family background, but sample sizes are extremely small. Our
principal analysis, therefore, has focused on the RCS. The data on reservists provide
reasonable sample sizes of female veterans and nonveterans. At the same time, the sample
provides a natural control for unobserved preferences and abilities, since selection criteria and
perhaps tastes are similar among individuals serving in the active duty military and the
reserves.
The evidence from all three data sets indicates that female veterans possess a higher level
of measured earnings endowments than do nonveterans. Moreover, evidence from the RCS
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and NLS is consistent with the hypothesis that ability and other wage determinants
unobservable in the CPS are positively correlated with measured endowments. In the civilian
labor force, female veterans have a wage advantage (based on CPS mean wage differences),
whereas among reservists wages of veterans display wage rates slightly below that of
nonveterans. Using the CPS, all of the wage differential is accounted for by measured
characteristics, whereas in the RCS and NLSY a modest veteran wage disadvantage, following
control for measurable wage determinants, is evident. In both the RCS and CPS, veteran-
nonveteran wage differentials are more favorable among nonwhites than among whites, are
higher among college graduates than among those with less schooling, and are similar among
draft-era and AVF-era cohorts.
The evidence presented here, at least for white women, provides little evidence to
support the contention that military service provides work experience that is of superior value
to that available in the civilian labor market. Under the most favorable estimates from the
CPS, time spent in military service by white women has a value equivalent to time spent in the
civilian labor market. And based on data from the RCS and the small NLSY sample, white
female veterans are at an earnings disadvantage relative to their nonveteran counterparts. An
exception to the above is the relatively better civilian wage performance evident in both the
CPS and RCS among nonwhite female veterans. Negative wage differentials among recent
veteran cohorts would be neither troubling nor surprising, if they were accompanied by faster
wage growth. But we find no evidence of a steeper earnings-experience profile among female
veterans, nor a wage performance relative to nonveterans that improves with age.
Given the relatively high recruiting standards the military has adopted for women,
evidence of a veteran wage advantage would not have been surprising. At present, however,
women are severely limited as to the occupations in which they may serve within the military.
The low civilian returns to military service may result in part from the narrow opportunities
for skill enhancement given women within the military, military training that is
nontransferable to civilian jobs, or an inability to transfer these skills to the civilian sector
owing to occupational barriers to women in jobs utilizing these skills. 7 If this is the case,
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enhanced opportunities for women in the military that are expected to accelerate, coupled with
declining sex segregation in the civilian labor market, should produce more favorable civilian
performance outcomes for future waves of female veterans.

Endnotes
'Mangum and Ball (1989) provide a brief survey of this literature. More recently,
Angrist (1990) has addressed in some detail selectivity issues using information on date of
birth for veteran and nonveteran birth cohorts affected by the draft lottery in the late Vietnam
period (1970-1972).
2Despite the magnitude of this coefficient, it is not statistically significant. Their wage
equation does not control for part-time status, a particularly important wage determinant
among women (nonveteran women are more likely to work part-time than are veterans).
3The 1986 Reserve Components Surveys of Selected Reserve Officer and Enlisted
Personnel (RCS) were conducted by the Department of Defense to assess a wide range of
manpower issues and personnel policies. The population of the basic samples consisted of
trained selected reservists. The surveys were administered to approximately 109,000
reservists. The population of reservists in 1986 was 1.1 million (Department of Defense,
1989). The member population was stratified by reserve component, reserve category,
enlisted status, and sex; within most strata, the design provided for a 10 percent sample. The
questionnaires were administered at reserve units during March and April 1986. The response
rate for enlisted personnel was 59.7 percent, yielding usable responses for 60,120 persons.
4In this regard, the RCS shares some features with samples of siblings and twins that
have been used in estimating the returns to education.
5There has been much debate on the relationship between tenure and earnings. For a
summary of this debate, see Hutchens (1989); a recent contribution to this literature is Brown
and Light (1992). The RCS provided no information on tenure in the civilian job.
6Logarithmic wage differentials are converted to percentage differentials by the
approximation, [exp(a)-l]100, where a is the log differential.
7The military and civilian occupations and industries in which women are employed
differ from those of nonveterans. To some extent, the military may provide a mechanism by
which women can gain training and subsequent entry to nontraditional civilian jobs to which
they might otherwise be excluded. We find weak evidence along these lines. When we
estimate a log earnings equation from the CPS excluding occupation and industry dummies, the
veteran differential increases from .003 to .017. Although both coefficients are quite small,
the direction of change suggests that veteran status may provide access to women to
occupations and industries that are somewhat higher paying than those obtained by otherwise
similar nonveterans.
Table 1 : Regressions for Separate Veteran and Nonveteran
Log Wage Equations from the RCS Data
Veterans Nonveterans
Variables Means Coeff. |t| Means Coeff. |t|
Education 13.636 .039 (3.286) 13.312 .036 (4.028)
Experience 11.953 .029 (2.433) 10.619 .032 (4.667)
Exper. sq. /100 1.903 -.050 (1.695) 1.601 -.040 (1.873)
Married .357 .017 (0.404) .317 .022 (0.068)
Public .525 .051 (0.788) .443 .069 (1.519)
Nonwhite .288 .134 (2.908) .401 -.001? (0.017)
Children .743 -.036 (1.597) .669 .005 (0.325)





Dependent variable is the log of the hourly wage; its mean is 2.005 for veterans
and 2.030 for nonveterans.
Table 2. Decomposition of Veteran-Nonveteran
Wage Differentials by Race and Era
Sample
Log Wage Endowment Coefficient
Gap Effect Effect
RCS:
All -.0248 .0642 -.0891
White -.0471 .0760 -.1232
Nonwhite .0300 .0389 -.0088
Draft Era -.1019 .0223 -.1243
Volunteer Era .0179 .0879 -.0700
NLSY (Volunteer
Era, All Women) :
Without AFQT .0755 .0645 .0109
With AFQT .0755 .0874 -.0118
CPS:
All Women .0649 .0615 .0034
All Men .1345 .1523 -.0178
Log wage gap is the unadjusted difference in the
means of the log wage. The endowment effect is the
sum of the differences in explanatory variables
times the nonveteran coefficients; the coefficient
effect or adjusted differential is sum of the
differences in coefficients times the veteran means.
See the text for further discussion.
Table 3: Regression Results from the RCS and CPS Based on Alternative
Specifications — Female and Male Veteran-Nonveteran
Differentials by Race, School Group, and Era
RCS CPS CPS
Specification Females Females Males
1. VET -.0926 (3.411) 0.0033 (0.473) -0.0154 (8.515)
2. VET -.1262 (3.855) -0.0027 (0.347) -0.0158 (8.286)
NW*VET .1064 (1.835) 0.0375 (1.958) 0.0031 (0.582)
3. VET*SCH<=12 -.1058 (2.649) -0.0068 (0.612) -0.0177 (7.790)
VET*SCH13-15 -.1012 (2.492) -0.0086 (0.673) -0.0272 (8.169)
VET*SCH16+ -.0472 (0.820) 0.0333 (2.320) -0.0031 (0.916)
4. VET*DRAFT -.1221 (3.133) 0.0090 (0.848) -0.0096 (4.538)
VET*AVF -.0690 (1.963) -0.0011 (0.119) -0.0294 (9.209)
5. WH*VET*DRAFT -.1378 (3.064) 0.0032 (0.286) -0.0096 (4.368)
NW*VET*AVF -.0883 (1.233) -0.0078 (0.743) -0.0319 (9.291)
WH*VET*DRAFT -.1171 (2.737) 0.0538 (1.578) -0.0008 (0.135)
NW*VET*AVF .0269 (0.446) 0.0334 (1.428) 0.0180 (2.000)
N 1, 946 322,,702 343, 748
RSC sample: Dependent variable is log of hourly wage. Also included in all equations
are years of schooling completed, potential experience and its square, currently
married, nonwhite, part-time, number of children, public sector worker, and dummies
for broad industry and occupation.
CPS sample: Dependent variable is log of real hourly wage, in December 1992 dollars.
Also included in all equations are years of schooling completed, potential experience
and its square, married spouse present, ever married but spouse not present, union
membership, nonwhite, part-time, number of children in primary family, federal (exc.
postal), state, local, postal, and large metropolitan area. Also included are dummies
for Census region, broad industry, broad occupation, and year.
Table 4: Variable Means and Regression Results for Separate Female
Veteran and Nonveteran Log Wage Equations from the CPS
Veterans Nonveterans
Variable Mean Coeff. |t| Mean Coeff. |t|
Education 13.606 0.054 (12.093) 13.162 0.056 i[150.005)
Experience 20.366 0.015 (6.058) 20.760 0.015 (73.211)
Exp. sq./lOO 5.523 -0.025 (5.378) 5.905 -0.026 (65.017)
Married, w/ spouse 0.531 -0.019 (0.860) 0.585 0.057 (26.287)
Ever married w/o sp . 0.291 -0.000 (0.009) 0.212 0.046 (18.306)
Union 0.154 0.201 (8.783) 0.135 0.151 (64.278)
Nonwhite 0.160 -0.003 (0.141) 0.148 -0.041 (19.644)
Part time 0.213 -0.102 (5.126) 0.236 -0.127 (69.771)
Children 0.775 -0.017 (2.082) 0.737 -0.009 (11.064)
Federal 0.099 0.066 (1.972) 0.024 0.048 ( 8.793)
State 0.074 -0.014 (0.400) 0.053 -0.024 ( 6.459)
Local 0.101 -0.058 (2.017) 0.124 -0.083 (31.298)
Postal 0.022 0.140 (2.237) 0.006 0.131 (13.448)
Large CMSA/MSA 0.405 0.094 (5.848) 0.453 0.124 (78.627)
Region (8) yes yes
Industry (5) yes yes
Occupation (13) yes yes
R-sq 381 .411
N 3, 331 319,371
Dependent variable is log of real wage rate. The mean of the dependent variable is
2.2595 for veterans and 2. 1946 for nonveterans. Included variables are years of schooling
completed, potential experience and its square, married spouse present, ever married but
spouse not present, union membership, nonwhite, part-time, number of children in primary
family, federal (exc. postal), state, local, postal, and large metropolitan area. Also
included are dummies for Census region, broad industry, broad occupation, and year.
Appendix
Female and Male Veteran Status, Wages, Schooling,
and Race, by Birth Cohort, 1989-92 CPS
Birth
Cohort N VET Wn Wn Wv/Wn Sv SD Sv-Sn NWV NWn
Females:
< 1930 16,597 1.20 13 .70 9.00 1.52 13 .66 12 .01 1.65 2.51 12 .03
1930-34 16,888 0.89 12 .97 10.20 1.27 13 .40 12 .41 0.99 3.97 13 .29
1935-39 22,520 0.90 11 .80 10.50 1.12 13 .45 12 .70 0.75 10.84 14 .34
1940-44 30,928 0.81 14 .16 11.03 1.28 13 .90 13 .04 0.86 9.60 14 .18
1945-49 41,133 0.93 12 .03 11.41 1.05 14 .08 13 .36 0.71 12.53 14 .71
1950-54 46,859 1.06 11 .86 11.33 1.05 14 .30 13 .45 0.84 16.73 15 .82
1955-59 49,903 1.38 10 .92 10.99 0.99 13 .69 13 .39 0.30 19.25 16 .15
1960-64 48,629 1.28 9 .83 10.17 0.97 13 .07 13 .44 -0.37 22.87 15 .34
1965-72 49,245 0.68 7 .96 8.07 0.99 12 .80 13 .15 -0.35 20.47 14 .37
All 322,702 1.03 11 .24 10.35 1.09 13 .61 13 .16 0.44 15.97 14 .85
Males:
< 1930 16,726 67 .25 13 .99 12.04 1.16 12 .81 11 .15 1.65 7.41 17.52
1930-34 19,156 64 .20 16 .22 14.31 1.13 13 .04 11 .57 1.47 7.72 17.40
1935-39 24,656 48 .49 16 .68 15.76 1.06 13 .19 12 .43 0.76 7.75 14.93
1940-44 31,966 40 .12 17 .00 16.37 1.04 13 .45 12 .99 0.46 8.37 14.72
1945-49 41,787 43 .49 16 .33 16.42 0.99 13 .63 13 .54 0.09 8.87 14.40
1950-54 48,716 22 .23 14 .47 15.44 0.94 13 .29 13 .63 -0.34 11.57 13.00
1955-59 54,453 13 .03 12 .83 14.01 0.92 12 .95 13 .32 -0.37 15.25 12.21
1960-64 54,213 10 .53 11 .05 12.09 0.91 12 .66 13 .15 -0.49 14.38 11.93
1965-72 52,075 5 .94 8 .71 8.89 0.98 12 .44 12 .62 -0.18 13.23 12.53
All 343,748 27 .12 15..11 13.31 1.13 13 .18 13 .05 0.13 9.61 13.13
N is the CPS sample size, VET is the percentage veteran, Wv and Wn are the mean wages in
December 1992 dollars for veterans and nonveterans, Sv and Sn are mean years of schooling
for veterans and nonveterans, and NWV and NWn are the percentages nonwhite among veterans
and nonveterans. Wage ratios and schooling differences are calculated prior to rounding.
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